Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information
- 1 November 1991
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 37 (3) , 323-329
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(91)90230-i
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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