Cooperation and the Use of Coercion by Groups and Individuals

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Abstract
In two experiments, male and female subjects, either as individuals or as groups, participated in a Prisoner's Dilemma and could communicate either threats of punishment for target noncooperation or promises of their own cooperation. In Experiment 1 they opposed a live target; in Experiment 2 they opposed a simulated target who was either cooperative or competitive in response to the subjects' messages. The major finding was that groups more strongly preferred the use of threats than did individuals. Groups were more competitive than individuals at the outset in both experiments; in Experiment 2 the difference was found consistently on message-related trials. In Experiment 2 there was also a series of interactions generally showing that individual women opposing a cooperative target were most cooperative and conciliatory, while men in groups opposing a competitive target were most competitive and coercive. Postexperimental ratings of the simulated target indicated a polarization of impressions in the groups. Women targets in Experiment 1 were more cooperative against individuals than against groups; there was no difference for men. Targets opposing groups rated the opponent as less likable and less credible than targets opposing individuals.