Skeptical rationalism
- 1 January 1979
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 22 (1-4) , 281-320
- https://doi.org/10.1080/00201747908601877
Abstract
To improve our methods of rational inquiry and decision‐making we need to recognize that such methods should guide but not fully determine the choices of individuals. Failure to acknowledge the essential incompleteness of rational methods made the methods of Classical Rationalism quite impractical and opened them to skeptical refutation. Mitigated Skepticism and Fideism failed to correct the error, and as a result put undesirable limits on rational inquiry. When the guiding character of rational methods is recognized, existing methods of scientific research of personal and social decision‐making can themselves be rationally assessed and improved. Viewing rational methods as guides thus opens a whole field of inquiry, the inquiry into what rational methods are most useful for specific purposes and in specific situations.Keywords
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