Efficient search and recruiting: Choosing sides in matching games
- 31 January 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 54 (1) , 59-63
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00905-6
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Side Choice and Bargaining under Asymmetric InformationEconomica, 1995
- Transactions Costs, Frictional Unemployment and Technical Change in the Market TechnologyInternational Economic Review, 1995
- Choosing Sides in Matching Games: Nash Equilibria and Comparative StaticsEconomica, 1990
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and UnemploymentThe Review of Economic Studies, 1990