How Universal is Behavior? A Four Country Comparison of Spite, Cooperation and Errors in Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms
Preprint
- 1 January 2001
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper studies the universality of behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the NetherlaKeywords
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