How Bumble-Bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation
- 1 September 1996
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Studies
- Vol. 44 (4) , 668-685
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb01748.x
Abstract
This paper confirms the existence of public interest groups as a theoretical puzzle for an Olson type (economically-driven) rational choice explanation. It systematically reviews different theoretical approaches that challenge this appearance of paradox. The paper also introduces some British survey data. It concludes that rational choice analysis must subsume non-material incentives, but shows that discussions predicated on conceptions of rationality other than that used by Olson do not imply that participation is a problem to be explained. It also points to the importance of group activity in shaping the preferences of potential members and in stimulating membership.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Provision of Benefits by Interest Groups in the United StatesThe Journal of Politics, 1992
- The Rational Choice Approach to Politics: A Challenge to Democratic TheoryThe Review of Politics, 1991
- Belief Congruence between Interest-Group Leaders and Members: An Empirical Analysis of Three Theories and a Suggested SynthesisThe Journal of Politics, 1990
- Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political ActionAmerican Political Science Review, 1989
- The Political Economy of Group MembershipAmerican Political Science Review, 1985
- Rational Models, Collective Goods and Nonelectoral Political BehaviorThe Western Political Quarterly, 1982
- On Joining Interest Groups: An Empirical Consideration of the Work of Mancur Olson Jr.British Journal of Political Science, 1976