WHEN POLITICS PAYS: FACTORS INFLUENCING MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION DECISIONS
- 1 September 1990
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Personnel Psychology
- Vol. 43 (3) , 599-614
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.1990.tb02398.x
Abstract
Pay allocation decisions of 123 industrial uniform industry managers were investigated. Results showed that the managers awarded higher pay raises to a subordinate when they were dependent on the subordinate's expertise. Political connections led to a higher raise for the subordinate only when the subordinate made a dependency threat.This publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
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