The Projective Way of Knowing: A Useful Heuristic That Sometimes Misleads
- 1 October 2001
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Vol. 10 (5) , 168-172
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.00141
Abstract
For many purposes, people need a reasonably good idea of what other people know. This article presents an argument and considers evidence that people use their own knowledge as a basis for developing models of what specific other people know in particular, that they tend to assume that other people know what they know. This is a generally useful heuristic, but the assumption is often made uncritically, with the consequence that people end up assuming that others have knowledge that they do not have.Keywords
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