Minimum Winning Coalitions on the U.S. Supreme Court
- 1 July 1979
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Quarterly
- Vol. 7 (3) , 384-392
- https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673x7900700308
Abstract
It has been claimed that in nonthreat situations opinions of the Court tend to receive a minimum winning vote. Using the private papers of Justice Burton, the size of the original vote on the merits was compared with the size of the opinion vote. No support was found for the minimum winning thesis except that smaller than minimum winning coalitions at the original vote tended to become minimum winning at the opinion stage. This finding, however, can be explained as a consequence of the desire of the opinion writer to secure an authoritative opinion of the Court.Keywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Institutional Disunity, the Judges' Bill and the Role of the U. S. Supreme CourtThe Western Political Quarterly, 1977
- Equivalent Versus Minimum Winning Opinion Coalition Size: A Test of Two HypothesesAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1977
- Some Clarifications Regarding a Theory of Supreme Court Coalition FormationAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1977
- Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the Supreme CourtMidwest Journal of Political Science, 1972