Manipulation in political stock markets – preconditions and evidence
- 10 June 2004
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics Letters
- Vol. 11 (7) , 459-463
- https://doi.org/10.1080/1350485042000191700
Abstract
Political stock markets (PSM) are sometimes seen as substitutes for opinion polls. On the bases of a behavioural model, specific preconditions were drawn out under which manipulation in PSM can weaken this argument. Evidence for manipulation is reported from the data of two separate PSM during the Berlin 1999 state elections.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Political Stock Markets and Unreliable PollsThe Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 1999
- Wishes, expectations and actions: a survey on price formation in election stock marketsJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1999
- Can Asset Markets Be Manipulated? A Field Experiment With Racetrack BettingJournal of Political Economy, 1998
- Estimating the Probability of Events That Have Never Occurred: When Is Your Vote Decisive?Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1998
- To vote or not to vote: The paradox of nonvotingPublic Choice, 1984
- Is the act of voting rational?Public Choice, 1973