Economic consequences of regulated changes in disclosure: the case of executive compensation
- 31 August 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 35 (3) , 285-314
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(03)00035-1
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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