Self-Selective Social Choice Functions Verify Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorems
- 1 July 2000
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 68 (4) , 981-996
- https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00143
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofnessJournal of Economic Theory, 1977
- An example in group preferenceJournal of Economic Theory, 1975
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General ResultEconometrica, 1973
- Social choice theory without the Pareto PrincipleJournal of Economic Theory, 1972