Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences
- 1 January 1982
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 2 (1) , 23-33
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90041-5
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Les théories de l’intérêt général et le problème logique de l’agrégationÉconomie appliquée, 1952