The European parliament and the co‐decision procedure: A reassessment
- 1 September 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Legislative Studies
- Vol. 3 (3) , 58-73
- https://doi.org/10.1080/13572339708420518
Abstract
In this paper, I reassess the co‐decision legislative procedure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union. Specifically, I examine the dispute as to whether co‐decision enhanced or diminished the European Parliament's influence over EU law making. Employing a combination of formal analysis of the different stages of the procedure and evidence from its actual operation, I argue that Garrett and Tsebelis’ claim that co‐decision reduces Parliament's legislative powers is both theoretically and empirically unsupported. The implications for the Parliament's position within European politics are evaluated in the conclusion.Keywords
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