A two-level dynamic game of carbon emission trading between Russia, China, and Annex B countries
- 1 June 2008
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 32 (6) , 1830-1856
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2007.07.001
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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