Proxy contests and corporate change: implications for shareholder wealth
- 15 March 1998
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 47 (3) , 279-313
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00046-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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