The design of coordination mechanisms and organizational computing
- 1 January 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Organizational Computing
- Vol. 3 (1) , 121-134
- https://doi.org/10.1080/10919399309540197
Abstract
We provide an introduction to a theory of coordination mechanism design and show how to apply it to an assignment problem. The purpose is to introduce those familiar with organizational computing, but unfamiliar with game theory and economics, to the subject. We also describe briefly how we can test new mechanisms before taking them into the field. Finally, we raise some unresolved research questions.Keywords
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This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Experimental EconomicsPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1993
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