Presentation Format, Other-Person Strategies, and Cooperative Behavior in the Prisoner's Dilemma

Abstract
80 college students played a 50-trial Prisoner's Dilemma. Variables were manipulated at 2 levels each: (1) presentation format (matrix vs nonmatrix), (2) initial behavior of the confederate (hostile vs neutral), and (3) contingency of the confederate's choices (contingent cooperation vs noncontingent). Ss under the nonmatrix condition cooperated significantly more frequently than did Ss under the matrix condition and Ss playing with a confederate who behaved contingently cooperated more frequently than Ss playing with one who behaved noncontingently. Ss playing with an initially hostile confederate were at first more noncooperative than Ss playing with a neutral person but when the initially hostile confederate changed to a neutral strategy the difference between the 2 groups disappeared. None of the interactions were significant.

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