How Not to Defend Liberal Institutions
- 27 January 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 20 (1) , 1-14
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0007123400005676
Abstract
Liberal institutions (freedom of speech and religious worship, for example) will naturally be supported by liberals – that is to say, those with a liberal outlook. But what arguments can be addressed to non-liberals? There are some traditional arguments but these are too limited in scope to provide a general justification for liberal institutions. A recent argument that claims to do the job is to the effect that justice entails neutrality and neutrality entails liberal institutions. However, neutrality is a principle that could appeal to non-liberals only if they had already swallowed a large dose of liberalism, since it requires that they regard their deepest convictions as preferences or personal opinions. It is also doubtful whether liberals are well advised to embrace neutrality.This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Justice as Fairness: Political Not MetaphysicalPublished by Springer Nature ,1991
- LIBERALISMPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1978
- Public and Private MoralityPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1978
- A Theory of JusticePublished by Harvard University Press ,1971