TARIFF FORMATION IN A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VOTING MODEL*
- 1 March 1989
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economics & Politics
- Vol. 1 (1) , 61-79
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00005.x
Abstract
The theory of endogenous trade policy formation argues that tariffs emerge from the political process. This occurs because of conflicting economic interests trying to redistribute income in their favor through the adoption of suitable trade policies. Mayer and Riezman (1987) questioned this view arguing that if individuals differ only in factor ownership they would always prefer some tax/subsidy policy to tariffs. Here we allow individuals to differ not only with respect to factor ownership, but also with respect to consumption preferences and income tax treatment. We show that tariffs might be the social decision even though nobody's individual preferences suggest tariffs as the best choice.Keywords
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