Transparency versus Constructive Ambiguity in Foreign Exchange Intervention
Preprint
- 1 January 2003
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Based on a survey of 10 central banks and a review of existing literature, this paper examines the choice between transparency versus ambiguity in central banksKeywords
All Related Versions
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