Bequests, filial attention and fertility

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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show within a simple setting how the demand for children may be affected by the type of parent-children interaction, ranging from conflict with threat to more harmonious settlement. We consider the case where parents offer bequests to their children in exchange for attention. The type of parent-child interaction is formalized by the solution concept that is used to determine the bequest-attention allocation for any given number of children. The main positive finding of the paper is that there is a bias toward large families, counteracted by the possibility of a pure preference for small families and the costs of having children. Copyright 1991 by The London School of Economics and Political Science. (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.) (This abstract was
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