A Hierarchical Equilibrium Theory of Systemic War
- 1 March 1986
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Quarterly
- Vol. 30 (1) , 77-105
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2600438
Abstract
This study puts forward a theoretical framework which is suggested to explain the onset of systemic war and its absence during long periods of systemic continuity. The basis of this framework is an international structure, called the hierarchical equilibrium, which consists of: (a) two or more alliances (or other loose hierarchies such as loosely knit empires) of varying size and composition but clearly including a great power and a number of small powers within each; and (b) a relatively large number of small powers not formally associated with any of the great powers. A set of stochastic equilibrium equations is associated with the theory and was tested for the period 1816–1964 using Correlates of War dispute data. The equations were obeyed in the 19th century and post-World War II period, but not in the intervals approaching both World Wars, thus suggesting the ability of the framework to distinguish between essentially peaceful periods and those which are prone to the onset of systemic war.This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- Political Stability of Two-Party and Multiparty Systems: Probabilistic Bases for the Comparison of Party SystemsAmerican Political Science Review, 1984
- The Balance of Power as a "Just" Historical SystemPolity, 1983
- The Balance of PowerJournal of the British Institute of International Affairs, 1923