Bid shading and risk aversion in multi-unit auctions with many bidders
- 17 October 1997
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 56 (2) , 195-200
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81900-3
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- How Auctions Reveal Information: A Case Study on German REPO RatesJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 1997
- Seller surplus in first price auctionsEconomics Letters, 1996
- Optimal bidding in multi-unit auctions with many biddersEconomics Letters, 1995
- The Efficient Diversification of Bids in Treasury Bill AuctionsThe Review of Economics and Statistics, 1979