In Defence of the Priority View
- 31 August 2012
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Utilitas
- Vol. 24 (3) , 349-364
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0953820812000039
Abstract
In their paper , Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism is mistaken. I argue that their case against prioritarianism has much weaker foundations than it might at first seem. Their key argument is based on the claim that prioritarianism ignores the fact of the . However, prioritarianism, far from ignoring that fact, is a plausible response to it. It may be that prioritarianism disregards the fact of the . But even if this is true, that doesn't straightforwardly tell against prioritarianism as a view about distributive justice. In the end, Otsuka and Voorhoeve's argument relies on a non-decisive intuition that they appeal to early in their paper. Their conclusion, as a result, is not compelling.Keywords
This publication has 6 references indexed in Scilit:
- Why It Matters That Some Are Worse Off Than Others: An Argument against the Priority ViewPhilosophy & Public Affairs, 2009
- Egalitarianism DefendedEthics, 2003
- Incorporating societal concerns for fairness in numerical valuations of health programmesHealth Economics, 1999
- Value measurement in cost-utility analysis: explaining the discrepancy between rating scale and person trade-off elicitationsHealth Policy, 1998
- The separateness of persons, distributive norms, and moral theoryPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1993
- Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of RightPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1991