What is the Effect of Cross-Listing on Corporate Ownership and Control?
Preprint
- 1 January 2005
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper examines whether and how ownership structure changes when firms from emerging markets cross-list their shares on a U.S. stock exchange. Prior to listKeywords
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