VOTING IN FIRMS: THE ROLE OF AGENDA CONTROL, SIZE AND VOTER HOMOGENEITY

This publication has 12 references indexed in Scilit:

• Voting in Corporate Law
  The Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
• The Illyrian Firm Revisited
  The Bell Journal of Economics, 1983
• The Adjustment Processes of Labour Co-operatives With Constant Returns to Scale and Perfect Competition
  The Economic Journal, 1979
• Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models
  American Journal of Political Science, 1979
• Rights and Production Functions: An Application to Labor-Managed Firms and Codetermination
  The Journal of Business, 1979
• Instability of Simple Dynamic Games
  The Review of Economic Studies, 1978
• Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control
  Journal of Economic Theory, 1976
• Choice, faith, and politics: The political economy of hutterian communes
  Public Choice, 1972
• The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem
  The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1967
• Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting. An Essay in Honor of Adolf A. Berle
  Columbia Law Review, 1964