Refusals to deal and orders to supply in competitive markets
- 1 April 1999
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 17 (3) , 399-417
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(97)00032-5
Abstract
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This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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