Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance
Top Cited Papers
- 25 February 2000
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier
- Vol. 38 (2) , 163-184
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00809-f
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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