Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European Union
- 30 September 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Law and Economics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 345-361
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(96)00021-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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