The impact of functional responsibility and state legal constraints on the “revenue-debt” packages of U.S. Central cities

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Abstract
State governments have the power to restrict the revenue and debt sources available to their municipalities. States also have the power to assign functional responsibilities to their municipalities - - some of which can be extremely burdensome financially (educatin; welfare; hospitals). This research examines the effect of these state constraints on: (1) the revenue-debt use patterns; and (2) the fiscal condition of 243 U.S. central cities (FY 1974, FY 1975, 1976). The results show that the revenue/debt use patterns of cities vary signigficantly according to the restrictions imposed by the state on their taxing, borrowing, and functional responsibility powers. In addition, revenue/debt use patterns differ among ciites experiencing varying levels of distriess. Severely distressed cities are more dependent on external revenue sources (federal, state). They are less capable of generating revenue at the local level and are less flexible in their use of local revenue soruces, depending more hevily on the property tax and less heavily on nonproperty tax and nontax revenue sources than healthier cities. They are also found to be more reliant on full faith and credit (property tax-backed) long-term debt and on short-term debt than the more prosperous cities. Cities in states imposing heavy restrictions on use of property tax and full faith and credit long-term debt sources but imposing few restrictions on municipa; nonproperty taxing powers are generally the healthiest fiscally. Such state policies have effectively enhanced municipal diversification of both traditional revenue sources and debt sources. The major significance of this research is the demonstration that state governments have within their policy-making power the ability to affect the fiscal dependency level of their respective municipalities. An activist role is necessary on the part of state governments if they wish to increase their role in municipal fiscal affairs relative to that of the federal government.

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