Counterattack or Delay
- 1 March 1974
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 18 (1) , 75-106
- https://doi.org/10.1177/002200277401800104
Abstract
This paper reports a secondary analysis of a series of simulation runs which explored the effects of a broad array of variables on a nation's response to an imminent strategic attack from an unidentified source. Seven variables appeared as important in determining whether a nation would counterattack or delay retaliation when given such a warning. These variables include availability of a weapon survivability system, the economic and force capabilities of the nation, the decision makers' perceptions of the degree of tension in the world and of the degree of ambiguity in the situation, as well as the decision style and level of self-esteem of the decision makers. The results suggest that factors other than the invulnerability of weapon systems are involved in maintaining the stability of deterrence in an extreme crisis.Keywords
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