The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
- 1 September 2004
- journal article
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 72 (5) , 1583-1599
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00544.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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