Power, Alliance, and the Escalation of International Conflict, 1815-1965
- 1 December 1984
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 78 (4) , 1057-1069
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1955807
Abstract
A considerable amount of the international politics literature attempts to explain international conflict on the basis of the distribution of power between and among nations. There are, however, divergent views of this linkage. One view argues that wars are most likely to take place between nations of similar power, while another asserts that wars are most likely when power is unequal. Research seeking to explore this phenomenon has not investigated the capability augmenting effects of alliances on power relationships and has tended to focus its attention upon the occurrence of wars. This research examines the individual and joint effects of power and alliance upon the probability of 256 conflicts to escalate to reciprocated military action. The main finding is that equality of power, supplemented by alliance with a major power for those nations that are weak, tends to restrain the likelihood that a conflict will escalate.Keywords
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