Interdependence in worker productivity
- 30 September 2003
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Econometrics
- Vol. 18 (5) , 585-604
- https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.738
Abstract
This paper investigates interactions between co‐worker productivity levels in a rich empirical context. Workers have unambiguous output measures, compensation that depends on individual and group output to differing degrees and potential peers beyond their immediate work group. Important productivity interdependencies exist, which could arise from the group‐based component of compensation, peer pressure, common supervisors or information exchanges, but not group‐based output or technological interdependence. Workers with the strongest individual incentives seem least sensitive to these interactions. In contrast, they are important to workers with no individual incentives. For these workers, peer pressure must be a powerful influence. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
This publication has 23 references indexed in Scilit:
- Worker Cooperation and the Ratchet EffectJournal of Labor Economics, 2000
- Psychological team make-up as a determinant of economic firm performanceJournal of Economic Psychology, 1998
- Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and EvidenceJournal of Labor Economics, 1998
- Team Human Capital and Worker MobilityJournal of Labor Economics, 1997
- Peer Pressure in an Agency RelationshipJournal of Labor Economics, 1997
- The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club GoodsPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1996
- Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricultural TeamsJournal of Political Economy, 1993
- Workgroups, Efficiency Wages and Work EffortJournal of Post Keynesian Economics, 1992
- Firms' Choice of Method of PayILR Review, 1990
- The Emergence of Norms in Competitive Decision-Making GroupsAdministrative Science Quarterly, 1985