Leveled commitment contracts with myopic and strategic agents
- 1 March 2001
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
- Vol. 25 (3-4) , 615-640
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(00)00039-7
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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