Interest Groups: Economic Perspectives and Contributions
- 1 January 1990
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 2 (1) , 85-108
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692890002001004
Abstract
This paper affords an informal introduction to the work of economists on interest groups and their role in the political process. Among the major analysts considered are Olson, Stigler, Posner, Peltzman, Becker and the Virginia economists, notably Tullock and Tollison. Political scientists are encouraged to become familiar with this body of work because the study of `rent-seeking' is now a major enterprise within public choice.Keywords
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