Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games
Open Access
- 1 April 2005
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 87 (1) , 95-101
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.007
Abstract
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