Performance versus design standards in the regulation of pollution
- 1 October 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 19-44
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(87)90043-0
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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