Postulates of Rational Preference
- 14 March 1967
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 34 (1) , 18-22
- https://doi.org/10.1086/288119
Abstract
The postulates of rational preference suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern have been defended as descriptive or empirical generalizations and as normative principles. It is argued that the postulates are inaccurate empirical generalizations and unacceptable normative principles.Keywords
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