The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms

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Abstract
The paper examines the determinants and performance consequences of equity grants to senior-level executives, lower-level managers, and non-exempt employees of "new economy" firms. We find that many of the equity grant determinants and their relative importance vary significantly between new and old economy firms. In addition, we find that employee retention objectives, which new economy firms rank as the most important goal of their equity grant programs, have a significant impact on new hire grants, but not on annual, ongoing grants. Our exploratory performance tests indicate that lower than expected option grants and/or existing option holdings are associated with lower accounting and stock price performance in subsequent years. However, we find that greater than expected option and equity grants and holdings have little consistent association with future performance.

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