Arbitrage, Speculation, and Public Policy Toward Ticket Scalping

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Abstract
Ticket scalping is typically analyzed from the point of view of the demanders of the product. The question of why a profit-maximizing producer would let someone purchase its product for speculation or arbitrage has typically been ignored in the literature. There are at least three reasons why a profit-maximizing firm might permit purchase of its product for resale. One reason is that uncertainty and risk aversion on the part of the firm provides an opportunity for speculation in the product by a less risk averse firm. A second reason is that the producing firm may face different cost functions than the ticket scalper, permitting arbitrage or a middleman to exist and make a profit. The third reason is that the dynamic revenue function of the firm may differ from the ticket scalper's revenue function, creating an arbitrage opportunity. Finally, a public choice perspective suggests that producers are the likely source of inspiration for laws against ticket scalping.

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