Control benefits and CEO discipline in automatic bankruptcy auctions
- 4 June 2003
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Financial Economics
- Vol. 69 (1) , 227-258
- https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(03)00126-0
Abstract
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All Related Versions
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