Agenda control by budget maximizers in a multi-bureau setting
- 1 January 1981
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 37 (3) , 447-472
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133745
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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