The Political Market for Government Assistance to Australian Manufacturing Industries*
- 1 June 1980
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Record
- Vol. 56 (153) , 132-144
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4932.1980.tb01661.x
Abstract
This paper applies the emerging neoclassical economic theory of politics to the question of why some industries receive more government assistance than others. Various determinants of the incentives for interest groups to demand assistance and for governments to supply assistance are suggested on a priori grounds. An attempt is then mode to see how well these factors can explain (I) the differences between rates of assistance to Australia's munufacturing industries at various points in time between 1968–49 and 1977–78. and (2) the different changes in those rates during the mid‐1970s. The evidence generally supports the theory, and prompts some suggestions as to how to reduce existing government distortions.Keywords
This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
- ON WHY RATES OF ASSISTANCE DIFFER BETWEEN AUSTRALIA'S RURAL INDUSTRIES*Australian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 1978
- Public Policy and the Australian Tariff StructureAustralian Journal of Management, 1978
- SOME CAUSES OF STRUCTURAL MALADJUSTMENT IN THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMYEconomic Papers: A Journal of Applied Economics and Policy, 1978
- The Political Economy of Canada's Tariff Structure: An Alternative ModelCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1977
- Toward a More General Theory of RegulationThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1976
- Economic Models of Political Choice: Canada's Tariff StructureCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1976
- Income distribution and effective protection in a multicommodity trade modelJournal of Economic Theory, 1975
- Pressure Groups and the Pattern of TariffsJournal of Political Economy, 1975
- Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group SizeAmerican Political Science Review, 1974
- Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic RegulationThe Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1974