Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet
- 1 December 1999
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 89 (5) , 1063-1080
- https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.5.1063
Abstract
William Vickrey's predicted equivalences between first-price sealed-bid and Dutch auctions, and between second-price sealed-bid and English auctions, are tested using field experiments that auctioned off collectible trading cards over the Internet. The results indicate that the Dutch auction produces 30-percent higher revenues than the first-price auction format, a violation of the theoretical prediction and a reversal of previous laboratory results, and that the English and second-price formats produce roughly equivalent revenues.Keywords
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