EMU: Why and How It Might Happen
- 1 November 1997
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Perspectives
- Vol. 11 (4) , 3-22
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.4.3
Abstract
This paper reviews the history, economic rationale, and main components of the project of establishing a monetary union in Europe by 1999. The adoption of a single currency is shown to be the best available option following the liberalization of capital movements. Most of the institution's design (central bank independence and objective, fiscal restraints) reflect Germany's fears of inflation as it is asked to give up its currency. The fiscal restraints are excessive, however, and a source of contractionary bias. The paper also presents the timetable of the final countdown.Keywords
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