Abstract
Since their inception, Nigerian marketing boards have been used to serve various interests and purposes, hardly any of which have benefited the producers. They originated in the Second World War and were perpetuated after the war by a Labour government so that they might play their part in ‘meeting British needs’, to cite the title of a forthcoming study by Mike Cowen and Bob Shenton. Nigerian politicians found them a ready‐made instrument for taxing farmers, enriching themselves and financing their political activities. Their pricing policies discouraged farmers from producing export crops, thus rendering the boards redundant though not, regrettably, ensuring their abolition. Nigeria is fortunate in that, until recently, marketing boards have not bought food for sale in domestic markets and have no monopoly, in form or in fact, over the purchase of crops, other than cotton, for sale within Nigeria. Discussion of the Nigerian marketing boards has tended, rightly, to focus on their monopoly of the legal export of certain crops, on their pricing policies and on the use to which governments put the funds which they derived from the trading profits of the boards. Less remarked on, the boards also structured the internal marketing system for the commodites they export. Indeed, when the commodity marketing boards were established in 1947 the main justification given was the need to change the internal marketing system for export crops, ostensibly in the interests of protecting the producer from the ills of middlemen in an unregulated market. These arguments for state intervention in, and regulation of, produce marketing, in Nigeria as elsewhere in Africa, have found sympathy among socialists who have been all too willing to take statism as at least offering a foundation for socialism. This article examines the provenance of the marketing boards and of the arguments which justified their inception during the crisis of the colonial economy in the 1930s.

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