Incentive‐Compatible Pollution Control Policies under Asymmetric Information on Both Risk Preferences and Technology
- 1 May 2004
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 86 (2) , 291-306
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00579.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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