The kernel of a cooperative game
- 1 September 1965
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
- Vol. 12 (3) , 223-259
- https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800120303
Abstract
The kernel of a cooperative n‐person game is defined. It is a subset of the bargaining set 𝔐(i). Its existence and some of its properties are studied. We apply it to the 3‐person games, to the 4‐person constant‐sum games, to the symmetric and n‐quota games and to games in which only the n and the (n‐1)‐person coalitions are allowed to be non‐flat.In order to illustrate its merits and demerits as a predictor of an actual outcome in a real‐life situation, we exhibit an example in which the kernel prediction seems frustrating. The opinions of other authors are quoted in order to throw some light on this interesting example.Keywords
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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- n-Person games with only 1, n − 1, and n-person permissible coalitionsJournal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 1963
- Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative gamesBulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1963
- Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1963
- 20. Quota Solutions of n-Person GamesPublished by Walter de Gruyter GmbH ,1953